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ABSTRACT 
Section 7 of the United States’ National Labor Relations Act 
allows groups of American workers to engage in concerted activity 
for the purposes of collective bargaining or for “other mutual aid 
or protection.” This latter protection has been extended in cases 
such as Lafayette Park Hotel to workers outside the union context. 
Starting in 2005, the National Labor Relations Board increasingly 
signaled to employers that concerted activity may take place on 
social media such as Facebook. However, the Board proper 
delivered its first written opinion articulating these rules in the 
2012 case of Hispanics United of Buffalo, Inc. There, the Board 
found the employer in question to have committed multiple unfair 
labor practices when it fired five employees over a series of 
Facebook posts due to violating the employer’s zero-tolerance no 
bullying policy. 
This article argues that the majority opinion of the Board 
misapplied Lafayette Park Hotel’s test for whether employer 
conduct “would reasonably tend to chill employees” from 
legitimate, protected uses of their §7 rights. This article explains 
the two largest errors in the Board’s decision: (1) a failure to 
identify a missing, important element for concerted activity 
protection under §7, the nexus between employee discussion and 
contemplated group action, and (2) asserting an “inferred group 
intent” existed that was “implicitly manifest” which linked the 
employees’ Facebook posts to contemplated group action protected 
under §7. 
Members of the entire Board, as well as other legal scholars 
writing on this topic, have been guilty at different times of 
simplifying social media to being like a “virtual water cooler” for 
the 21st century. The facts in Hispanics United show why this 
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analogy does not work: rather than a short face-to-face 
conversation with a finite, known audience in the space of minutes, 
it was a series of written messages plopped down in sequential 
order throughout an entire day, written for an audience of unknown 
size and make-up that may not even include the co-workers it 
ostensibly addressed. As Hispanics United helps illustrate, the 
proper handling of employer retaliation on social media remains 
the sensible application of the established nexus requirement for 
finding concerted activity. 
INTRODUCTION 
‘Then you should say what you mean,’ the March Hare went on. 
‘I do,’ Alice hastily replied; … ‘at least I mean what I say–’ 
‘Not the same thing a bit!’ said the Hatter. 
LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE’S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND 
Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) enshrines 
the right of certain classes of American workers to engage in concerted 
activity for the purpose of collective bargaining or “other mutual aid and 
protection.”1 Not only is it illegal for employers to retaliate against 
employees who have engaged in concerted actions,
2
 it is also illegal for 
employers to adopt company rules that “would reasonably tend to chill 
employees” in using their § 7 rights.3 The National Labor Relations Board 
(“NLRB”), the federal agency established by the NLRA for its enforcement, 
4
 interprets § 7 protection to apply outside the union context when (1) 
multiple employees (2) do an activity in concert (3) for those employees’ 
mutual aid or protection, with a nexus between the activity performed and 
the employees’ “interests as employees.”5 
 In the seminal case of Hispanics United, the National Labor 
Relations Board answered how traditional §7 protection works in the new 
                                                     
1
 National Labor Relations Act § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006). 
2
 Id. § 158(a)(1); see also NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 618 (1969) 
(“If there is any implication that an employer may or may not take action solely on 
his own initiative for reasons unrelated to economic necessities and known only to 
him, then it is a threat of retaliation based on misrepresentation and coercion not 
protected under the First Amendment.”). 
3
 Lafayette Park Hotel, 326 N.L.R.B. 824, 25 (1998). 
4
 National Labor Relations Act § 3. 
5
 See Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 567-8 (1978) (“[S]ome concerted 
activity bears a less immediate relationship to employees’ interests as employees 
than other such activity. We may assume that at some point the relationship 
becomes so attenuated that an activity cannot fairly be deemed to come within the 
“mutual aid or protection” clause.”). 
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context of social media.
6
 This case was the first case tried
7
 before the NLRB 
providing the Board’s reasoning process for employees’ protection under § 
7 of the NLRA when using social media in a non-union workplace.
8
 As the 
dissent in the case notes, Hispanics United expands the boundaries for when 
co-workers officially “join in” an activity protected under § 7.9 
Existing legal scholarship describes the decisions leading up to 
Hispanics United in great detail.
10
 This Note instead focuses on the Board’s 
ruling in Hispanics United, and explains why it is an unusual decision, even 
when compared to these earlier cases. As Board member Hayes explains in 
his dissent, the Hispanics United majority erred by inferring a concerted 
objective where employees “did not suggest or implicitly contemplate doing 
anything in response,” but only engaged in unprotected “mere griping.”11 
This Note also challenges both the majority and the dissent’s 
characterization of social media as the 21st century’s “virtual water 
cooler.”12 This comparison emerges in much other legal scholarship on how 
both employers and the legal system treat or ought to treat social media.
13
 
                                                     
6
 Hispanics United of Buffalo, Inc., 359 N.L.R.B. No. 37 (2012). 
7
 In 2011 the NLRB reached a settlement with American Medical Response of 
Connecticut, Inc., after the NLRB’s office in Hartford, CT issued a Complaint 
against AMR on Oct. 27, 2010, based on the discharge of an employee for posting 
negative comments about her supervisor on her Facebook page. See Brian Hall, 
NLRB’s “Facebook Firing” Case Against AMR Settles, EMPLOYER LAW REPORT 
(Mar. 18, 2013, 12:00 PM), http://www.employerlawreport.com/2011/02/articles/ 
workforce-strategies/nlrbs-facebook-firing-case-against-amr-settles. 
8
 Hispanics United, 359 N.L.R.B. No. 37 at 2. 
9
 See id. at *5-6 (Hayes, dissenting). 
10
 See Robert Sprague, Facebook Meets the NLRB: Employee Online 
Communications and Unfair Labor Practices, 14 U. Pa. J. Bus. L. 957, 962-3 
(2012) (Examining in detail 36 different charges addressed by the NLRB, its Office 
of the General Counsel, and its Administrative Law Judges, filed by employees for 
discipline or discharge that employees allege occurred because of online 
communications, principally Facebook); Bryan Russell, Facebook Firings and 
Twitter Terminations: The National Labor Relations Act as a Limit on Retaliatory 
Discharge, 8 Wash. J. L. Tech. & Arts 29, 33-39 (2012). 
11
 Hispanics United, 359 N.L.R.B. No. 37 at *5 (Hayes, dissenting). 
12
 Id.; see also Mark Pearce, Chairman, NLRB, quoted in Stephen Greenhouse, 
Even If It Enrages Your Boss, Social Net Speech Is Protected, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 
2013, at A1 (“Many view social media as the new water cooler . . . All we’re doing 
is applying traditional rules to new technology.”). 
13
 See Christine O’Brien, 45 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 29, 66 (2011) for an example of 
formal legal scholarship making a similar analogy (“The web is where employees 
gather for what used to be onsite “water cooler” discussions regarding terms and 
conditions of employment.”); see also Greenhouse, supra note 12, at A1, for similar 
analogy used in general news press (“As Facebook and Twitter become as central 
to workplace conversation as the company cafeteria, federal regulators are ordering 
employers to scale back policies . . .”).  
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But despite social media’s differences from other media, these differences 
do not require the Board to abandon its previous approach towards what 
constitutes concerted activity, as other writers suggest.
14
 Instead, as Board 
member Hayes suggests in his dissent,
15
 the social media paradigm requires 
a return to the nexus requirement for concerted action. 
To serve the original Congressional intent of balancing the interests 
of employer and employees, existing labor law must be applied in the same 
way it was always applied to the new realities of social media. This requires 
asking that plaintiffs meet the initial burden of proof that Hayes demanded 
and that the majority conceded in Hispanics United: plaintiffs must allege 
facts establishing a nexus linking employee online conduct with the 
workplace. The only other alternative requires the majority’s approach in 
Hispanics United: softening the elements required to show that an employer 
unreasonably chilled an employee’s § 7 rights. In Hispanics United, the 
majority accomplished this by identifying an “implicitly manifest” mutual 
aid objective in the co-workers’ Facebook posts. The majority’s approach is 
the wrong treatment of concerted activity in social media, for three 
fundamental reasons: it goes against the language and purpose of the 
National Labor Relations Act, it is unfair to employers, and it is a short-
sighted treatment of social media as being so innovative that it mandates 
changing existing labor law as we know it. 
I. FACTS AND HOLDINGS FROM HISPANICS UNITED 
A. Facts of the Case 
Hispanics United of Buffalo, Inc. (HUB), a non-profit in New York 
state,
16
 employed 30 individuals,
17
 including Lydia Cruz-Moore and the 
alleged discriminatees Mariana Cole-Rivera, Damicela Rodriguez, Ludamar 
                                                     
14
 See Ariana C. Green, Note, Using Social Networking To Discuss Work: NLRB 
Protection for Derogatory Employee Speech and Concerted Activity, 27 Berkeley 
Tech. L.J. 837, 888-9 (2012) (“[T]he General Counsel should allow NLRB 
attorneys more leeway in interpreting when online speech is protected on social 
networks. Precedent based on standards of concerted activity and opprobrious 
behavior serve in some cases, but in others, the attorneys should display more 
agility in considering the context of social networking posts.”) (emphasis added). 
15
 Cf. Hispanics United, 359 N.L.R.B. No. 37 at *5 (Hayes, dissenting) (“[T]he 
mere fact that the subject of discussion involve[s] an aspect of employment—i.e., 
job performance—is not enough to find concerted activity for mutual aid and 
protection. There is a meaningful distinction between sharing a common viewpoint 
and joining in a common cause. Only the latter involves group action for mutual aid 
and protection.”) 
16
 Hispanics United, 359 N.L.R.B. No. 37 at *9. 
17
 Id. at *12. 
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“Ludahy” Rodriguez, Yaritza Campos, and Carlos Ortiz de Jesus.18 During 
their employment, in personal conversations and text messages with Cole-
Rivera and the other discriminatees, Cruz-Moore had criticized other HUB 
employees for performing poorly at work. 
19
 On October 9, this alleged 
pattern of criticism came to a head in a conversation thread Cole-Rivera 
created on her own Facebook page.
20
 Cole-Rivera’s original post was 
prompted by Cruz-Moore informing Cole-Rivera earlier that day, “that she 
was going to raise these concerns with [HUB’s] executive director, Lourdes 
Iglesias.”21 Perhaps anticipating that Cruz-Moore would allege to Iglesias 
that Cole-Rivera and other HUB employees performed poorly at work, and 
exasperated after hearing Cruz-Moore’s past complaints about the same, 
Cole-Rivera wrote about it on her profile page that day. 
Board member Hayes’s dissent alludes to the Facebook postings on 
October 9th as being like a “colloquy around the Facebook ‘virtual water 
cooler.’”22 However, while both the majority and dissent in Hispanics 
United seem comfortable with treating the employees’ postings like an 
instantaneous conversation between co-workers, the conversation thread 
was in fact a series of posts exchanged over approximately twelve hours as 
people checked into and out of Facebook during the morning and 
afternoon.
23
 The sequence of the five discriminatees’ Facebook posts is as 
follows: 
Table 1: Alleged Discriminatees’ Initial Facebook Posts24  
 Time 
Elapsed 
Time of 
Post 
Poster Text of Post 
#
1 
 10:14am Mariana 
Cole-
Rivera 
Lydia Cruz, a coworker feels 
that we don’t help our clients 
enough at HUB I about had it! 
My fellow coworkers how do 
u feel? 
 
#
2 
+5 min. 10:19am Damicela 
Rodriguez 
What the f. .. Try doing my 
job I have 5 programs 
 
                                                     
18
 Id. at *10-11. 
19
 Id. at *10. 
20
 Id. at *10-11. 
21
 Id. at *10. 
22
 Id. at *5 (Hayes, dissenting). 
23
 Id. at *10-11. 
24
 Id. (using the unaltered text from original Facebook posts in the Text of Post 
column). 
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#
3 
+ 7 min. 10:26am Ludimar 
Rodriguez 
What the Hell, we don’t have 
a life as is, What else can we 
do??? 
#
4 
+45 min. 11:11am Yaritza 
Campos 
Tell her to come do mt 
fucking job n c if I don’t do 
enough, this is just dum 
#
5 
+30 min. 11:41am Carlos 
Ortiz de 
Jesus 
I think we should give our 
paychecks to our clients so 
they can “pay” the rent, also 
we can take them to their Dr’s 
appts, and served as 
translators (oh! We do that). 
Also we can clean their 
houses, we can go to DSS for 
them and we can run all their 
errands and they can spend 
their day in their house 
watching tv, and also we can 
go to do their grocery shop 
and organized the food in their 
house pantries … (insert 
sarcasm here now) 
#
6 
+ 4 min. 11:45am Mariana 
Cole-
Rivera 
Lol. I know! I think it is 
difficult for someone that is 
not at HUB 24-7 to really 
grasp and understand what we 
do ..I will give her that. 
Clients will complain 
especially when they ask for 
services we don’t provide, like 
washer, dryers stove and 
refrigerators,  I’m proud to 
work at HUB and you are all 
my family and I see what you 
do and yes, some things may 
fall thru the cracks, but we are 
all human:) love ya guys 
The conversation began to diverge after noon, with individuals 
responding to Facebook posts that were not in sequence and not only 
responding to the immediately preceding post. 
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Table 2: Facebook Posts, Upon Becoming Nonsequential / Off-Topic
25
 
 Time 
Elapsed 
Time of 
Post 
Poster Text of Post 
#
7 
+25 min. 12:10pm Nannette 
Dorrios
26
 
Who is Lydia Cruz? 
#
8 
+26 min. 12:11pm Yaritza 
Campos 
(responding to #6) Luv ya too 
boo 
#
9 
+ 1 min. 12:12pm Mariana 
Cole-
Rivera 
(responding to #7) She’s from 
the dv program works at the 
FJC at hub once a week. 
#
10 
+58 min. 1:10pm Jessica 
Rivera
27
 
Is it not overwhelming enough 
over there? 
#
11 
+ 1 hour, 
17 min. 
2:27pm Lydia 
Cruz-
Moore 
Marianna stop with ur lies 
about me. I’ll b at HUB 
Tuesday.. 
#
12 
+29 min. 2:56pm Mariana 
Cole-
Rivera 
Lies? Ok. In any case Lydia, 
Magalie
28
 is inviting us over 
to her house today after 
6:00pm and wanted to invite 
you but does not have your 
number i'll inbox you her 
phone number if you wish. 
#
13 
+9 
hours, 
34 min. 
10:30pm Carlos 
Ortiz 
(responding to #12) Bueno el 
martes llevo el pop corn 
[Good, Tuesday, I’ll bring the 
popcorn]
29
. 
Lydia Cruz-Moore then complained in a text message to HUB’s 
Executive Director, Iglesias, about the Facebook posts from her co-
workers.
30
 The Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) who first heard this case 
stated that Cruz-Moore “was trying to get Iglesias to terminate or at least 
discipline the employees,” even though it was “not clear why she bore such 
                                                     
25
 Id. 
26
 Nannette Dorrios serves as a member of HUB’s Board of Directors (id. 
(alteration in original)). 
27
 Jessica Rivera serves as Secretary to HUD Director Iglesias (id. (alteration in 
original)). 
28
 Magalie Lomax, HUB’s Business Manager (id. (alteration in original)). 
29
 Id. (alteration in original). 
30
 Id. 
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animosity against the other employees” against whom she had no readily 
apparent prior dispute.
31
 
Three days after Cruz-Moore complained about the Facebook posts, 
Executive Director Iglesias met individually with all five employees who 
posted the Facebook comments in Table 1.
32
 Iglesias told each employee 
that they had violated HUB’s zero-tolerance employee policy against 
bullying or harassment of co-workers.
33
 At these meetings, Iglesias also 
alleged that Cruz-Moore suffered a heart attack because of the bullying, and 
that HUB needed to pay compensation to Cruz-Moore in response.
 34
 At the 
trial level, however, the ALJ found that there was zero evidence that a heart 
attack had ever occurred.
 35
 In fact, the ALJ found that Iglesias lacked any 
rational basis for believing that the discriminatees’ Facebook posts were at 
all related to Cruz-Moore’s health.36 Nevertheless, Iglesias told each of the 
five discriminatees “that she would have to fire them.” The individual 
employees received termination letters either on the spot or else several 
days later in their mailboxes.
37
 HUB never replaced any of the fired 
employees, and instead seemed to absorb the drop in labor from thirty to 
twenty-five employees by giving their work responsibilities to other 
employees.
38
 
B. Holdings in Hispanics United: Concerted Activity Occurred, for 
Implicitly Manifest Goal 
Affirming the ALJ’s decision, a three-member majority of the 
NLRB found that (1) the Facebook postings by Cole-Rivera and the four 
other employees in Table 1 were concerted activity protected under § 7 of 
the NLRA, and that (2) HUB’s discharges of these five employees because 
of the Facebook postings were unfair labor practices in violation of § 
8(a)(1) of the Act.
39
 The Board also adopted the ALJ’s recommended 
remedy, ordering HUB to compensate the discriminatees for lost earnings 
and benefits, in addition to offering full reinstatement to their former 
positions.
40
 
                                                     
31
 See id. 
32
 Id. at *11-12. Iglesias did not meet with her secretary Jessica Rivera, who 
posted Comment #10 at 1:10pm. Id. 
33
 Id. at *12. 
34
 Id. 
35
 Id. 
36
 Id. 
37
 Id. (emphasis added). 
38
 Id. 
39
 Id. at *4. 
40
 Id. at *4, *15-16. 
190 SHARING IS AIRING [Vol. 12 
 
The NLRB’s opinion in Hispanics United begins by examining 
Meyers Indus., Inc. (Meyers I) for the standard for when an employer’s 
discipline or discharge of an individual employee violates § 8(a)(1) and is 
considered an unfair labor practice.
41
 Under Meyers I, § 8(a)(1) is violated 
when (1) the employee engages in concerted activity (within § 7’s 
meaning), (2) the employer knew of the concerted nature of the employee’s 
activity, (3) the concerted activity was protected under the NLRA, and (4) 
the discipline or discharge was motivated by the employee’s activity.42 The 
Board took  elements (2) and (4) as undisputed, because  HUB had fired the 
employees after making print-outs of the entire Facebook thread on Cole-
Rivera’s profile page, and because the discriminatees had all posted 
comments responding to other employees’ posts.43  Instead, the Board 
centered its analysis on elements (1) and (3).
44
 Because Hayes’s and this 
Note’s analysis focus on the majority’s treatment of element (1), the 
Board’s findings on element (3) (whether the NLRA protects the activity if 
at all) will be examined first, followed by its findings on element (1) 
(whether the employee’s activity was concerted for purposes of § 7 
protection). 
1. Held: The NLRA Protects Employee Discussions on Social Media About 
Work Performance. 
 The Board cited two separate cases for the “long held” proposition 
“that Section 7 protects employee discussions about their job 
performance.”45 However, both of these can be distinguished from the facts 
in Hispanics United, because employees that have received § 7 protection 
have always done something more than just talk.
46
  
In the first case the Board cited, Praxair Distribution, two 
employees brought various work-related grievances to their managers.
47
 The 
employer committed an unfair labor practice by firing the two employees 
after their complaints.
48
 Praxair is unlike Hispanics United because in 
                                                     
41
 Id. at *2. 
42
 Meyers Indus., Inc. (I), 268 N.L.R.B. 493, 497 (1984). The Board’s analysis 
also included the expanded Meyers II definition of concerted activity, which 
includes an individual’s activity when done to initiate, induce, or prepare for 
group action. Meyers Indus., Inc. (II), 281 N.L.R.B. 882, 887 (1986). See below 
Part I.B.2 for a description of the Board’s reasoning using both Meyers 
decisions. 
43
 Hispanics United, 359 N.L.R.B. No. 37 at *2 n.8. 
44
 Id. at *2. 
45
 Id. at *3 (citing Praxair Distrib., Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 91 at *11 (2011); 
Jhirmack Enters., 283 N.L.R.B. 609, 609 n.2 (1987)). 
46
 Hispanics United, 359 N.L.R.B. No. 37 at *6 (Hayes, dissenting). 
47
 Praixair Distrib., Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 91 at *11. 
48
 Id. 
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Hispanics United neither Cole-Rivera nor any other employees told or 
planned to tell management about Cruz-Moore’s complaints, but only 
discussed the anticipated complaints between themselves.
49
 The Hispanics 
United circumvents this distinction by finding a shared intent to speak to 
management to have been implied in the HUB employees’ private speech,50 
though nothing the employees wrote actually indicates this.
51
 
The other case the majority cites, Jhirmack Enterprises,
52
 is 
distinguishable because of what was said and to whom. There, the 
discriminatee was not merely telling a co-worker that other employees 
complained about the slow pace of his work, but was trying to “encourage 
[the co-worker others complained about] to take corrective action to protect 
his job.”53 Furthermore, the discriminatee represented a group of co-workers 
who were concerned about how one co-worker’s slow performance 
adversely affected the terms and conditions of every other employee’s job, 
such as by reducing the group’s chances for winning a weekly production 
award and by increasing the possibility of the company’s employees being 
asked to work overtime.
54
 
The Board’s misplaced reliance on Praxair and Jhirmack allowed it 
to conclude with too little legal analysis that HUB employees’ 
conversations about Cruz-Moore’s complaining might be protected under 
the NLRA as a form of concerted activity. However, the dissent Hayes’s 
opposite position, that the NLRA clearly does not protect conversations on 
these topics, is not well-supported by case law either. Instead, the entire 
Board ought to have started at the statute’s language rather than case law: 
was the conversation “for those employees’ mutual aid or protection,”55 or 
not? Perhaps the employees were not building an anticipatory defense to 
Cruz-Moore’s complaints with their Facebook posts, but were achieving 
other mutually-beneficial aims that § 7 would protect. Cole-Rivera’s post 
made the targets of Cruz-Moore’s complaints aware of Cruz-Moore’s 
intentions, as well as non-targeted employees with connections to HUB’s 
                                                     
49
 Hispanics United, 359 N.L.R.B. No. 37 at *6, n.6 (Hayes, dissenting). 
50
 Id. at *3. 
51
 See supra Tables 1, 2, and accompanying notes 24 and 25. One co-worker, 
Yaritza Campos, suggested telling Cruz-Moore to do Campos’s job, but there 
were no other suggestions about saying anything to anyone else with HUB, let 
alone HUB management such as Iglesias. See id. 
52
 Jhirmack Enters., 283 N.L.R.B. 609, 609 (1987). 
53
 Id. at n.2. 
54
 Id. 
55
 National Labor Relations Act § 3. 
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management.
56
 The discriminatees’ Facebook posts also likely relieved 
workplace stress among Cole-Rivera and her co-workers.
57
 
Rather than examine any alternative ends achieved by the HUB 
employees’ Facebook conversation, both the majority and dissent in 
Hispanics United studied only one possible objective of the Facebook 
posts—preparing a group defense to Cruz-Moore’s complaints.58 Focusing 
on this one possibility tied this part of the legal analysis to the acting-in-
concert test: either the employees had responded to one another’s posts 
intending a prepared, cohesive response to Cruz-Moore’s charges, or they 
were individually griping about work conditions and venting to one another. 
As the following section explains, the majority erred at this point in 
identifying an “implicitly manifest” group objective in the sparse text in 
these Facebook posts. 
2. Held: HUB Employees’ Facebook Posts Constituted Concerted Activity 
Between the Employees, and Was Protected Under § 7. 
The Board also held that the employees’ actions constituted 
concerted action, even though “Cole-Rivera failed to tell her co-workers 
that Cruz-Moore was going to voice her criticisms to Iglesias.”59 This was 
based on the Board’s dual definition of concerted activity from its two 
Meyers decisions: 
 Meyers I: Activity which is “engaged in with or on the 
authority of other employees, and not solely by and on 
behalf of the employee himself.”60 
 Meyers II: Activity in “those circumstances where 
individual employees seek to initiate or to induce or to 
prepare for group action, as well as individual 
employees bringing truly group complaints to the 
attention of management.”61 
The Board held that Cole-Rivera’s own activity in making her 
initial Facebook post
62
 was concerted under the Meyers II expanded 
definition of concerted activity, because “Cole-Rivera’s Facebook 
communication [under all the circumstances] had the clear ‘mutual aid’ 
                                                     
56
 See text accompanying notes 26–-28 supra. 
57
 See supra Table 1 accompanying note 24, row #6 (Cole-Rivera expressed 
appreciation to the other four discriminatees for their work at HUB and their 
responses to her original post). 
58
 Hispanics United, 359 N.L.R.B. No. 37 at *3. 
59
 Hispanics United, 359 N.L.R.B. No. 37 at *2–-3. 
60
 Meyers Indus., Inc. (Meyers I), 268 N.L.R.B. 493, 497 (1984). 
61
 Meyers Indus., Inc. (Meyers II), 281 N.L.R.B. 882, 887 (1986). 
62
 Table 1, supra note24, Post #1. 
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objective of preparing her coworkers for a group defense” to Lydia Cruz-
Moore’s complaints to HUB’s Executive Director Iglesias.63 The objective 
was clear “[e]ven absent an express announcement about the object of 
[Cole-Rivera’s] activity [because] ‘a concerted objective may be inferred 
from a variety of circumstances in which employees might discuss or seek 
to address concerns about workings conditions.’”64 
The Board also held the activity of all five alleged discriminatees in 
posting and reposting on Cole-Rivera’s Facebook page as being concerted 
activity under definitions from either Meyers case. According to the 
majority opinion in Hispanics United, their activity was concerted under 
Meyers I because “Cole-Rivera’s four coworkers made common cause with 
her, and, together [they undertook actions] with . . . other employees.”65 
Alternatively, the five employees’ conduct was concerted under Meyers II 
because “they were taking a first step towards taking group action to defend 
themselves against the accusations they could reasonably believe Cruz-
Moore was going to make to management.”66 
The NLRB’s alternative theories for why the alleged discriminatees 
acted in concert all suffer from a lack of supporting evidence in the case’s 
facts.
67
 Going back to § 7’s actual language, activity is protected under the 
NLRA when “[e]mployees . . . engage in other concerted activities for the 
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.”68 
Section 7 affords protection only to employees acting on theirs and others’ 
interest. Yet the Acting General Counsel for the NLRA offered no evidence 
showing that the original Facebook post or the subsequent posts were done 
for the mutual aid or protection of the other employees that posted on Cole-
Rivera’s Facebook wall.69 The ALJ discredited testimony from Cole-Rivera 
that she was planning to speak with Executive Director Iglesias in response 
to Cruz-Moore’s complaints.70 This discredited testimony directly 
undermines the majority’s assertion that Cole-Rivera’s first Facebook post 
“had the clear ‘mutual aid’ objective of preparing her coworkers for a group 
defense.”71 While the majority is correct that “that the intent to be engaged 
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 Hispanics United, 359 N.L.R.B. No. 37 at *3. 
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 Id. (quoting Relco Locomotives, Inc., 358 N.L.R.B. No. 37, *2 (2012)). 
65
 Id. at *2. 
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 Id. (quoting Administrative Law Judge Amchan, at *14). 
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 Id. at *5 (Hayes, dissenting). 
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 National Labor Relations Act § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006) (emphasis added). 
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 Hispanics United, 359 N.L.R.B. No. 37 at *5-6 (Hayes, dissenting). 
70
 Id. at *6, n.6. 
71
 Id. at *3 (per curiam). 
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in group action need not be expressly stated [but] can be inferred,” this still 
requires something from which the necessary intent may be inferred.
72
 
The fundamental problem in the Hispanics United majority’s 
analysis is the absence of an essential ingredient: there was simply no 
“evidence of a nexus between employee discussions and group action.”73 
Evidence linking employee talk to possible group action must exist for § 7 
protection over that talk. Without contemplated group action, talk between 
employees remains just mere talk.
74
 This basic, obvious rule appears in Daly 
Park Nursing Home,
75
 a case cited in Hayes’s dissent. In Daly, one 
employee spoke with his co-workers about another co-worker’s discharge, 
but was not protected under the NLRA because “there [was] no evidence 
that [the employee, or any others she spoke with,] contemplated doing 
anything about the discharge.”76 The majority in Hispanics United seeks to 
differentiate Daly by claiming that, “[r]ather than preparing for group 
action,” the employee in Daly and her co-workers had agreed that group 
action would be futile.
77
 There was no such agreement in Daly, however—
only comments from the alleged discriminatee, that “the discharge was 
‘unfair’ and that it was a shame [that the discharged co-worker] could not 
hire a lawyer[, and that hopefully that co-worker] would at least be able to 
receive unemployment compensation.”78 The Daly discriminatee’s 
comments only reflected the belief that the co-worker could not do 
anything; the discriminatee said nothing about whether the other employees 
could do something in concert to change this outcome. The HU majority 
imputes this disbelief in concerted action’s effectiveness onto the Daly 
discriminatee, once again without supporting evidence from the record. It is 
a false distinction that impermissibly lets the HU majority get away with 
ignoring the rule in Daly. 
The Hispanics United majority’s logic inverts the nexus 
requirement shown in Daly: it not only presumes that employees will 
always intend to do something about dissatisfaction with anything to do 
with work, but will intend to do something in concert. There is no evidence 
of such intent in Hispanics United: none of the HUB employees alluded to 
future activities that they fully intended to do in the future.
79
 The HUB 
employees expressed outrage towards Cruz-Moore’s criticism, but not one 
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 See also id. at *6, n.7 (Hayes, dissenting) (identifying the absence of calls to 
action or planned future action in the Facebook posts). 
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 Hispanics United, 359 N.L.R.B. No. 37 at *6 (Hayes, dissenting). 
74
 Id.  
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 287 N.L.R.B. 710 (1987). 
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 Id. at 711. 
77
 Hispanics United, 359 N.L.R.B. No. 37 at *3, n.10. 
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 Daly Park Nursing Home, 287 N.L.R.B. 710, 710 (1987). 
79
 See Table 1, supra note 24. 
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wrote anything suggesting going to Iglesias or any other HUB managers.
80
 
In the three intervening days between the Facebook conversation and 
Iglesias’s termination of the alleged discriminatees, not one of the 
discriminatees went to management to discuss or rebut what Cruz-Moore 
said or would say.
81
 Nevertheless, the majority in Hispanics United asserts 
that all five discriminatees’ intent to respond in concert to Cruz-Moore’s 
complaints was “implicitly manifest from the surrounding circumstances.”82 
The Board’s treatment of the discriminatees’ actions on Facebook 
(and the discriminatees’ subsequent inaction for three whole days) likely 
stems from basic, prevailing misunderstandings in labor law over how 
people actually use social media. In Hispanics United, the Board misapplied 
the law when it looked past whether anything the discriminatees actually 
said on Facebook indicated or predicated concerted activity or attempts 
thereof. The Board skipped the traditional nexus requirement by 
interpolating an “implicitly manifest” intent to act from the HUB 
employees’ Facebook complaints. Interpolating a call to action from mere 
employee griping on social media is error, however. As the next section 
explains, social media’s very nature limits the probative effect of 
interactions like Facebook posts. In response to how little social media 
interactions actually tell us, labor law ought to demand more explicit 
evidence of some connection between what people say on social media and 
what they intend to effect. 
II. SOCIAL MEDIA, AND THE EMPLOYEE’S INTENT TO ACT IN 
CONCERT 
A. Analysis of NLRB’s Treatment of Social Media in Hispanics 
United 
Both the majority and the dissenting opinions in Hispanics United 
misconstrue the nature of social media. The best example of this 
categorizing mistake, occurring in both HU and in legal scholarship, is that 
of Facebook being like a water cooler in an office setting where employees 
meet and share news or gossip.
83
 Any treatment of social media under labor 
law as just a “place where people talk” ignores many important differences 
between social media and other modes of communication. Understanding 
these differences is key to applying tried-and-true labor law to social media 
communication in a way that is consistent with the existing corpus of labor 
law. 
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 See supra note 51, comparing TableS 1 and 2.  
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 See text accompanying note 32 supra. 
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 Hispanics United, 359 N.L.R.B. No. 37 at *3. 
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 See supra Tables accompanying notes 24-25. 
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First, the amount of time between different individuals’ responses 
on social media can vary significantly. In Cole-Rivera’s Facebook 
discussion, for example, the time that elapsed between new comments to 
her original post ranged from under a minute to nearly ten hours.
84
 The 
potential length of time between communications makes social media 
conversation less like a personal or telephone conversation and more like an 
exchange of traditional post. This variability in the time between responses 
cuts both ways, however; that traditional post letter will never be read five 
minutes after being sent, but a Twitter tweet or Facebook post may be read 
near-instantaneously, depending on message recipients’ access to social 
media at that specific moment of delivery. 
Cole-Rivera’s initial Facebook post and the subsequent comments 
also reflect their authors’ uncertainty regarding how many people may read 
or respond to their posts, and even who those people might be. Cole-Rivera 
addressed her original post to her “fellow coworkers,”85 yet her post 
received responses from a larger audience. This unanticipated larger 
audience included the administrative assistant to HUB’s executive director, 
a member of HUB’s board of directors, and the very same person Cole-
Rivera criticized in her initial post.
86
 The actual audience was also 
underinclusive of Cole-Rivera’s addressed audience, at least according to 
the scant evidence in the record.  HUB employed a total of 30 employees 
prior to firing Cole-Rivera and the other alleged discriminatees,
87
 yet only 
six co-workers replied to Cole-Rivera’s post. 88 Of course, the Facebook 
“conversation” as reproduced in Tables 1 and 2 supra does not necessarily 
reflect the true conversation that took place: the reader has no idea who read 
each message, responding to Cole-Rivera’s post, at what time, or any 
individual person read them whether there were additional comments posted 
and later deleted before they could be responded to. When Cole-Rivera or 
anyone else posted comments on Cole-Rivera’s original Facebook post, 
they likely would have no idea who would read these comments; or even if 
the persons they tried to address would read them. 
Despite the uncertainty surrounding the intended, expected, and 
actual audiences, and despite Cole-Rivera’s failure to explicitly tell anyone 
that she sought an objective (i.e. correcting managerial misperceptions 
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 TABLE 1, supra note 24. 
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 TABLE 2, supra note 25. 
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 Hispanics United, 359 N.L.R.B. No. 37 at *12. 
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 See TABLE 1, supra note 24. This number does not represent the number of 
people who read Cole-Rivera’s post without responding, or whether those 
people were also co-workers. The low number of responses strongly indicates, 
but does not prove, the failure of Cole-Rivera’s Facebook post reaching the 
intended audience.  
No. 1] DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW 197  
about the quality of the employees’ work), the majority in Hispanics United 
found that Cole-Rivera had a “clear ‘mutual aid’ objective [or] object of 
preparing her coworkers for group action [that] was implicitly manifest 
from the surrounding circumstances.”89 In so doing, the Board treated the 
record—the Facebook post and comments, as recorded supra Tables 1 and 
2—as wholly-accurate facts made subject to the standard analysis on 
whether employee concertedness exists. This treatment ignores these 
Facebook posts’ mutability and their elements of uncertainty. 
Social media communications are helpful, potentially highly-
probative evidentiary pieces. Labor law must bend and flex in such a way 
that modes like Facebook sharing and Twitter retweets become usable in 
rendering Board outcomes. At the same time, though, social media 
communications’ evidentiary weight must be balanced against their unique 
‘unknown’ dimensions. The Board could have balanced these competing 
facets better in Hispanics United by giving special attention to any 
developments (or the lack thereof) between the Facebook conversation and 
the discriminatees’ termination three days later, or whether any of the 
Facebook posts were edited or modified at any time. It would have been 
incorrect to simply dismiss the entire Facebook conversation as unusable in 
making the Board’s decision owing to these issues unique to social media. 
Until law and technology catch up with one another on this area, however, 
judicial bodies must limit their reliance on social media to a greater degree 
than as occurred in Hispanics United. 
B. Why Concerted Activity Analysis on Social Media Requires the 
Nexus Requirement 
Prior to the NLRB’s written decision in Hispanics United, many 
writers analyzed the NLRB’s many judgments and decisions and had 
already begun trying to determine a series of rules explaining what 
employers could do with their social media policies to avoid erring on the 
side of an unfair labor practice charge, frequently relying on language from 
NLRB decisions that are less directly on point
90
 or else comparing multiple 
cases to predict how the NLRB will treat an employer.
91
 This note will not 
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 Hispanics United, 359 N.L.R.B. No. 37 at *3. 
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 See Sprague, supra note 10, at 1005–06 (quoting Cont’l Grp., Inc., 357 
N.L.R.B. No. 39 at *6) (using the NLRB’s decision on overbroad rules to infer 
that the NLRB will act against an employer with an overbroad social media 
policy if an employee is disciplined for any concerted activity, regardless of 
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NLRA). 
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 See Russell, supra note 10, at 38 (“[C]ases seem to indicate that the NLRB is 
less concerned with whether the employee used social media than with the 
underlying purpose of those actions.”). 
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undertake the same kind of meta-analysis that has been done so thoroughly 
as legal scholars like Robert Sprague, especially since so many authors 
reach a similar conclusion: enforcement of the NLRA’s larger prohibition 
on  § 7-chilling employer policies,
92
 as it relates to social media, has been 
all over the map.
93 
 In a note on employer policies involving social 
networking, Ariana Green observed the number of inconsistent NLRB 
decisions on social media in the last several years.
94
 Green blamed these 
cases’ inconsistent results on “an over-reliance on the traditional concerted 
activity standard,”95 and (besides recommending several very good ideas)96 
called on the General Counsel for the NLRB to “allow NLRB attorneys 
more leeway when online speech is protected on social networks,” so that 
attorneys can “display more agility in considering the context of social 
networking posts.”97 
 This proposal is incorrect. The traditional labor laws are not over-
relied upon and in need of replacement; they must simply be restored and 
applied. In order to allow employers and employees to engage in labor law 
as it was designed, the NLRB should apply a consistent “nexus” analysis.98 
This does not mean reversing the § 7 protection established under Meyers II 
for the individual employee who “seek[s] to initiate or to induce or to 
prepare for group action” but has not yet done so.99 This proposal only 
requires that the plaintiff’s prima facie case sufficiently allege that the sort 
of “mere griping” seen in Hispanics United was done in anticipation of 
doing something about the problem, by providing some evidence that the 
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 Lafayette Park Hotel, 326 N.L.R.B. 824, 825 (1998). 
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 See Sprague, supra note 10, at 962–-63 (comprehensive survey of 36 different 
cases handled by the NLRB involving social media policies, from mid-2009 to 
mid-2011 ), 1002–-03 (citations omitted) (concluding that “[w]hile an outright 
ban on section 7 activities would clearly violate section 8(a)(1), it is not always 
clear which types of prohibited communications may or may not chill section 7 
activities.”); Green, supra note 11, at 840–41 (citations omitted) (“[W]hen 
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 Id. at 840.  
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represented by a labor organization). 
97
 Id. 
98
 Hispanics United of Buffalo, Inc., 359 N.L.R.B. No. 37, at *6 (2012) (Hayes, 
dissenting). 
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 Meyers Indus., Inc. (Meyers II), 281 N.L.R.B. 882, 87 (1986). 
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court deems reliable and sufficient for the claim to go beyond “mere 
allegations.”100 
This proposal prevents employees from complaining in public about 
work, then doubling back and claiming protected concerted activity under § 
7 based on what they complained about (work) and not what they intended 
(enacting concerted activity to do something about it, or merely vent their 
personal exasperation).  The nexus rule as applied allows employers to 
discipline or discharge the gripers that are not sincerely interested in 
concerted action, while maintaining the NLRB Office of General Counsel’s 
strong prerogative to investigate charges for § 8(a)(1) violations involving 
non-unionized employees’ concerted activity. If Cole-Rivera’s case were 
done under these rules, for example, the employees could still win by 
providing reliable testimony or other evidence for the fact-finder that they 
were going to do something about their co-worker’s complaints to 
management. This could be any sort of evidence that would convince the 
fact-finder, such as screen captures of the Facebook pages, or testimony 
from the employees alleging concertedness. Instead, the ALJ in Hispanics 
United discredited the small amount of evidence that would show this 
intent: Cole-Rivera’s testimony claiming her intent to speak with HUB’s 
Executive Director to counteract Cruz-Moore’s complaints.101 Absent any 
positive evidence of plans by the discriminatees to do anything besides 
complain to one another, the HUB employees’ Facebook posts should be 
construed only as “mere talk.”102 
CONCLUSION 
Social media perhaps may prove as transformative as many claim it 
already is. Yet despite social media’s differences from other communicative 
media, the same concerted action analysis, requiring a nexus between 
activity and employee interests, ought to be applied. Without this nexus 
requirement, § 7’s protection for concerted activity covers employee griping 
whenever it is done without regard to employees’ intent, as had occurred in 
Hispanics United. It is impossible “that any [and every] conversation 
between employees comes within the ambit of activities protected by the 
Act provided it relates to the interests of the employees,”103 because not all 
griping leads to group action. This is especially for regarding social media, 
where one worker’s missive to a “world-wide web” always lies within a few 
mouse clicks.  
                                                     
100
 Cole-Rivera’s testimony was found unreliable in Hispanics United. See 
Hispanics United, 359 N.L.R.B. No. 37 at *6 n.6 (Hayes, dissenting). 
101
 See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text. 
102
 See Hispanics United, 359 N.L.R.B. No. 37 at *6 (Hayes, dissenting). 
103
 Mushroom Transp. Co. v. N.L.R.B., 330 F.3d 683, 685 (3d Cir. 1964). 
